The Winter War in the Eyes of the Iberian Peninsula States by Kaczorowski, Bartosz
Pilar Folguera (UAM)
Juan Carlos Pereira (UCM)
Carmen García (UAM)
Jesús Izquierdo (UAM)
Rubén Pallol (UCM)
Raquel Sánchez (UCM)
Carlos Sanz (UCM)
y Pilar Toboso (UAM)
(editores)
  
 
PENSAR CON LA HISTORIA 
DESDE EL SIGLO XXI 
 
Actas del
XII CONGRESO DE LA ASOCIACIÓN
DE HISTORIA CONTEMPORÁNEA
Pilar Folguera
Juan Carlos Pereira 
Carmen García
Jesús Izquierdo
Rubén Pallol
Raquel Sánchez
Carlos Sanz
Pilar Toboso
(editores)
UAM Ediciones, 2015
THE “WINTER WAR” IN THE EYES OF THE IBERIAN 
PENINSULA STATES
1
Bartos Kaczorowski
University of Lodz
It might seem that the so-called Winter War waged between the Soviet Union 
and Finland at the turn of 1939/1940 should not attract much interest from the Iberian 
Peninsula. The city of Helsinki, located approximately 3 thousand kilometers in a 
straight line from Madrid and Lisbon, was situated at the other end of the continent and 
therefore its policy did not have any major influence on the fate of Spain or Portugal. 
Moreover, already during the time of the German invasion on Poland in September 
1939 both Iberian countries declared their neutrality in the world conflict2. Spain was 
additionally worn out after the civil war, which made it extremely difficult for it to run 
its foreign policy independently, while Portugal was a small country, moving itself as 
far away from the European events as possible and therefore with limited influence on 
them. There was, however, one thing that sparked great interest in both Madrid and 
Lisbon towards the conflict at the far North: it was the definite hostility towards the 
Soviet Union, which made them support every adversary of Moscow. USSR was the 
greatest ally of the Republic during the civil war in Spain and protector of all 
communist parties that acted to overthrow Franco and Salazar’s regimes. Both dictators 
cherished traditional values and perceived communism as a threat not only to their 
authority but also to the world they professed. All of these factors made both Madrid
and Lisbon attribute great importance to the Soviet-Finnish war, far greater than could 
have been anticipated on basis of the existing subject literature.
The attitude of Spain and Portugal towards the Winter War has not received the 
necessary attention so far. It suffices to say that in the numerous works presenting 
Franco and Salazar’s policy during World War II only a few sentences were written on 
the subject3. Such a state of things can be partially blamed on the limited number of 
sources written in Spanish and Portuguese, especially after so many documents 
belonging to people responsible for Spain’s diplomacy have not been returned to the 
central archives. Even on basis of these sparse resources it would be, however, possible, 
to create a text of at least an exiguous nature. It seems then that the main reason for such 
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an omission on part of historians was their limited interest in the events taking place in 
the distant, from the perspective of the Iberian Peninsula, North, though both countries 
found the events quite important and turned out to be far more active in face of the 
conflict than their geographic location would have predestined them to. The hereby 
article is an attempt at filling in the gap in historiography, though the Author is fully
aware that continuation of the research – especially on basis of Finnish archives –
appears to be necessary4.
According to the Ribbentrop – Molotov treaty, in which two totalitarian 
superpowers shared Central and Eastern Europe between each other, Finland was to 
belong to the area of influence of the Soviet Union. Carrying out the resolutions of the 
pact, Joseph Stalin made the first demands of Helsinki on October 12th. He demanded 
the consent for moving the border by 25 kilometers into the inside of Finland in the area 
between the Gulf of Finland and Ladoga Lake, motivating it with the supposed risk 
Leningrad was being put at by the northern neighbor. Such a revision of the border 
would involve disassembly of the main fortification system protecting Helsinki from the 
South, i.e. the so-called Mannerheim’s line, which would make Finland vulnerable in 
case of a Soviet invasion and for this reason the proposal was rejected5. In view of the 
lack of consent to its demands, on 29th November Moscow broke off diplomatic 
relations with Finland and invaded the country on the next day. This is how the Winter 
War began, called Talvisota in Finnish, which made the Soviet Union authorities 
painfully aware of the fact that the Red Army, weakened by the recent cleansings, was 
in an awful condition despite its considerable superiority in numbers in relation to their 
enemy6. The heroic Fins earned the world’s respect for their devotion in the very first 
days of the conflict and the feelings towards them were no different on the Iberian 
Peninsula.
Spain in face of the Winter War
The Spanish were convinced about the absurd character of the Soviet demands 
from the very beginning. The Envoy in Helsinki, Fernando Valdés, stressed in his 
telegrams that the Finnish artillery did not even have proper cannons to conduct shelling 
of Leningrad from the Mannerheim’s line, on top of which the government declared 
strict neutrality7. Accepting Moscow’s conditions would mean vassalisation of Finland, 
while cession of the strategically important port Hanko would give the Soviets complete 
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domination in the region of the Gulf of Finland. For this reason, according to the 
Spanish diplomat, the demands had only one goal: to break off the diplomatic relations 
and give the Red Army a pretext to enter the territory of the neighboring country8.
The Soviet pressure exerted on the far weaker neighbor was immediately 
criticized by Madrid. The Fins’ attitude stirred great fondness of the Spanish society 
which perceived the resistance of the tiny nation as yet another stage of defending 
Europe against communism. A day after Moscow broke off the relations with Finland 
and a few hours before the armed invasion, a Spanish ABC journalist described the 
situation in the far North as follows: “Sympathy of the whole world lies with Finland in 
its resistance against the brutal and cynical neighbor”9. Everybody was, however, aware 
of Helsinki’s estrangement and Valdés pointed out the fact that the Western democracies 
demonstrated “obvious indifference”10 towards the case.
When Moscow began its military actions towards its neighbor, the clash started 
being presented in Spain as yet another attempt at stopping the expansion of 
communism, which turned Fins into somewhat continuators of the Francoists’ work 
from the civil war period. The Spanish press overflew with descriptions characteristic of 
years 1936-1939 and the most frequently used terms were fighting against “the Asian 
barbarian” and defending the Western civilization. It is no wonder then that the 
thoroughly destroyed Wyborg was compared to the Iberian Peninsula cities destroyed by 
the republicans11, while the charismatic marshal Carl Gustaf Mannerheim was identified 
with victorious general Franco12. Even though at first sight the two countries seemed to 
be totally different, the common element remained extremely powerful: it was the fierce 
anticommunism. It made itself visible during the civil war when Finland wholeheartedly 
supported the Francoists, which was unique as compared to the other Scandinavian 
countries faintly supporting the Republic, and illustrated the specific character of 
challenges the foreign policy of this country was facing13. It might only be surprising at 
first sight then that the liberal – peasant government in Helsinki did not grant visas to 
intellectualists who were planning to give a speech in 1937 at the International 
Conference of Antifascist Writers (Congreso Internacional de Escritores Antifascistas)
in Valencia, and shortly afterwards it excluded the republican ambassador Isabel de 
Palencia from the official celebrations of the Independence Day on 7th December14. The 
situation was not made easier for volunteers who wished to support the Republic, for 
which reason many of them had first to apply for a Swedish passport15.
3821
Actas del XII Congreso 
de la Asociación de Historia Contemporánea
Bartos Kaczorowski 
El Alcázar journal, grouping Francoist veterans of civil war, was a fierce 
advocate for the Finland case, and later on followed by the other newspapers16. The 
radically anti-Soviet tone of the Spanish press resulted, apart from the obvious fondness 
of Finland on part of particular journalists, also from the government’s policy, which 
offered the necessary instructions to the press through the mouth of the Minister of the 
Interior Ramón Serrano Suñer. The articles were supposed to “stress the amazing 
attitude of the Fins towards the Soviet attack”, emphasize the losses in the Red Army 
and the crimes it committed on civilians17. In other words, the journalists were called to 
write the truth with a sprinkling of phrases full of pathos.
The Spanish society offered a proof of its solidarity with the invaded country on 
numerous occasions. In a letter to the Finnish faithful, members of the Catholic Action 
(Acción Católica) assured them of their moral support and prayer for the tiny nation 
fighting “at the end of the world” against the Soviet onslaught. They also placed an 
equation mark between Talvisot and the Spanish “crusade”, for, as the letter read, “today 
at the frozen waters of Ladoga, just like yesterday at the burning banks of Ebro, battles 
for life and death are fought against common enemy of Christianity”18. Answering the 
call of the Finnish Church, the youth of this organization organized a dispatch of 500 
bottles of mass wine and 1500 liturgical candles to Finland as these goods were 
becoming sparse in the North. This symbolic gesture was appreciated by the Finnish 
Envoy in Madrid, George Winckelmann, who admitted that the Winter War, just like the 
one in 1936-1939, was waged in defense of the Christian faith19. Signs of sympathy 
with the fighting nation could also be observed in the Spanish immigrants living in 
Finland who left letters with wishes for the brave Suomi soldiers in the legation in 
Helsinki20.
Despite the poverty of the Spanish society and great losses suffered during the 
civil war, people started raising money for the fighting Fins and many entrepreneurs 
decided to offer quite large sums for this purpose. The whole action was coordinated by 
the Finnish legation in Madrid and consulates in particular cities, especially Barcelona 
and Valencia. The results were tangible: the Spaniards, still in a difficult economic 
situation, in January 1940 supported Finland with the total amount of 800 thousand 
marks. People were willing to offer aid in the form of readymade products, which, 
however, – because of the considerable distance between the two countries – were often 
not fit for transportation. Sending medicines or clothes seemed perfectly logical at such 
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a distance but the case was different with the Spanish fruit which quite often became the 
subject of philanthropy21.
The Spanish government spoke a week after the Soviet invasion. On 7th
December 1939 on its behalf, after a finished meeting, Minister of the Interior Ramón
Serrano Suñer passed on the following statement to the media: “Spain, which had 
fought like no other nation in defense of the Western civilization from the Asian 
barbarian, declares full support for the Fins in this difficult and heroic hour”22. For the 
first time in the conflict the Francoist authorities declared their support for Helsinki so 
firmly. Such an attitude was in line with the assurances offered to Winckelmann at the 
beginning of September by Beigbeder that in case of conflict between Moscow and 
Helsinki Madrid would not remain neutral as it did in case of war between Germany and 
Poland, Great Britain and France23. The attitude of the Francoist government was 
welcomed by Finland with satisfaction and on 14th December 1939 Winckelmann, on 
behalf of Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, sent special thanks to the Spanish Foreign 
Minister24. Also Portugal was satisfied with Madrid’s policy, which not long ago 
criticized Francoists for insufficiently manifested anticommunism25.
In the next stage of war, the moral support from general Franco’s country was 
manifested profusely. Representatives of the Spanish government took part in
demonstrations for the benefit of Finland or banquets organized for the success of the 
Finnish army. First-rate figures of the Spanish political life took part in one of them, 
thrown on 4th January by El Alcázar editorial staff in honor of Winckelmann: ministers 
Esteban de Bilbao and Rafael Sánchez Mazas, the legendary defender of Toledo general 
José Moscardó, as well as the head of the artillery general Carlos Martínez de 
Campos26. This fact was evidently symptomatic of the support for the Finnish case not
only fom the Spanish society but also from the official factors.
There were also quite a few who were ready to help Finland by offering their 
own blood. The youth belonging to Falange was more than eager to head North to fight 
against the common enemy. The Portuguese Envoy in Oslo dealing with the issues of 
Helsinki, José Mendes de Vasconcellos Guimarães, Viscount of Riba Tâmega, informed 
Lisbon that the declaration of the Spanish government from the 7th December 1939 
encouraged hundreds of volunteers to apply27. The Spanish government was, however, 
somewhat reluctant towards this initiative. Fearing a deterioration in their relations with 
Germany, it did not decide to organize a unit of volunteers and send it to the Finnish 
port. For a while Juan Beigbeder remained in favor of this concept, however, in face of 
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resistance from some pro-German ministers, he had to abandon it. It was definitely 
preferred in Madrid for the soldiers to head North on their own as such a solution would 
not cause any complications in relations with the Third Reich who remained an ally of 
Moscow28, and would still be a form of demonstrating the Spanish anticommunism29. It 
was decided that making the decision should be, however, postponed, hoping that – in
accordance with the rule of the Francoist authorities – time itself would solve the 
problem. The Spanish tardiness was received with disappointment in some 
anticommunist circles, as was symbolized by the letter sent to general Franco by 
Théodore Aubert, chairman of the International Entente Against the 3rd International 
(Entente internationale contre la IIIe Internationale), appealing for moral and military 
support for the Finnish defense30.
In December 1939 the authorities finally discontinued organizing volunteer 
troops, even though many were willing to go to Finland. The negative response was 
officially motivated with fatigue and necessity of reorganizing the Spanish army, which 
was probably true due to the recently finished civil war, though this aspect may not have 
had greater influence on the decision to send a few hundred soldiers to the Finnish front. 
The true reason resulted from political factors – mainly from the fear that such a 
decisive support of Helsinki may cause a deterioration in the relations with the Third 
Reich or involve Spain in the European war. 
The Spaniards also had doubts about provisions of the military weapons. In 
December 1939 Juan Beigbeder informed Finland about his readiness to begin 
negotiations on this topic, though difficulties appeared right away after a delegation 
from the North arrived on the Peninsula. Fins complained about excessively high prices 
in relation to the quality of the devices, as well as about the tardiness, typical of the 
Southerners, which resulted in continuous prolongation of the talks31. It seems, 
however, that also in this case delaying the moment of making the final decision did not 
result from the national character of the Spaniards but rather from the fear that aid 
offered to the enemy of the Soviet Union may damage relations with the Third Reich. 
The fact that such a threat was real is confirmed by, among others, the telegram sent on 
16th December by Antonio Magaz, in which he advised Juan Beigbeder not to use the 
services of the embassy in Berlin in his negotiations with the Fins concerning the 
weapons delivery, as the code it used did not guarantee secrecy of the correspondence 
and may be broken by the Germans. This might have very negative consequences for 
Madrid, especially given that Berlin was supporting the opposite side in the Winter 
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War32. This peculiar suggestion of the ambassador proved that the German – Soviet 
alliance was gaining strength and the Spanish initiative involved substantial risk as it 
was also targeted at the interest of the Third Reich.
Finally Madrid decided to see the matter through and accept weapon provision 
conditions. The agreement amounted to $1,2 million and involved howitzers, anti-tank
warfare, ammunition, artillery and telephone tracks. The delays in negotiations and 
previous hesitancy of the Spanish party led to the quite late delivery deadline. The 
Finnish vessel Greta reached the shore of Spain to pick up the aforementioned devices 
in mid-May 1940 when the war was already finished and returned to the freed Petsamo 
a month later33. These weapons could not have been used to win Talvisota but were used 
in the so-called continuation war when the Fins, using the German attack on the Soviets 
on 22nd June 1941 decided to attack Joseph Stalin’s country, wishing to retrieve their 
previous losses.
The way the negotiations were carried out must have been completely different 
from that of Fins, which does not, however, change the fact that the Francoist 
government offered a distant country from the North precious help, far greater than 
could have been anticipated judging by its geographic location. This decision resulted 
from the belief, common on the Iberian Peninsula, that an effort had to be made to stop 
the Soviet Union, after annexing the eastern part of the Republic of Poland and making 
the Baltic countries dependent on it, from growing stronger at the expense of Finland. 
Madrid’s hesitations reflected its complicated situation on the international stage, in 
which the Francoist authorities had to find the golden measure between their desire to 
carry out anti-Soviet policy and the necessary maintaining of appropriate relations with 
the Third Reich. This was also the reason for Spain not turning the case of weapons 
delivery to Finland into propaganda, which was what the far stronger Italians did. Spain 
preferred to deal with the case silently not to provoke its German ally34. The fact that 
these fears were well-grounded is confirmed by the case of the Spanish correspondent in 
Berlin, Ramón Garriga, who showed multiple signs of sympathy for the Fins, which 
was immediately noticed by the British press and gave it the opportunity for discussion 
about the durability of the German – Soviet alliance. Wilhelmstrasse reacted to the 
journalist’s attitude immediately and accused him of trying to break up the alliance with 
Moscow. During a private meeting with the Spanish correspondents, the head of the 
German press explained that the circumstances forced the Third Reich to turn a blind 
eye to the events in the North as he reminisced of the aid the Germans offered during 
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the civil war, unambiguously letting the other party know that the subject of Finland 
was not to be mentioned again35.
All of this left the Spanish government greatly disappointed by the attitude of the 
Third Reich in relation to the Soviet Union36. This slowly occurring change in the 
policy of Palacio de Santa Cruz37 was immediately noticed by the other participants of 
the European game. The British ambassador in Madrid, Maurice Peterson, pointed out 
that after the outbreak of the Winter War the Spanish stopped hiding the fact that the 
invasion was the work of Germany’s ally38. The papers started openly mentioning the 
close cooperation between Moscow and Berlin, which was a considerable difference as 
compared to the previous months when the tactical nature of Ribbentrop – Molotov pact 
was stressed, while actions undertaken in mutual agreement were carefully concealed39.
The Western Allies were gaining increasingly growing sympathy and they were clearly 
supported from the moment the first news of the possibility of them undertaking 
specific actions against Moscow appeared. When Duff Cooper, former war and navy 
minister, declared in the American Bridgeport that Great Britain was considering 
declaring war on the Soviets if they led to destruction of Finland40, a meaningful remark 
was made in the Catholic journal Ya: “Why wait till then?”41.
The deterioration of pro-German attitude on the Iberian Peninsula was also 
caused by the Christmas spirit which had exceptional character in 1939 as the society 
could have celebrated in peace for the first time after many years of war. The growing 
calls to oppose the Nazi from the Spanish Church and the call for termination of armed 
conflict which came from pope Pius XII during Urbi et Orbi, contributed to 
deterioration of the Spanish society’s opinion about Adolf Hitler’s policy. “In this 
exaltation of the faith there is an implied reproach against the Nazis, for the Spaniards, 
at long last, are becoming aware that there is no love lost between Nazis and Catholics, 
and are realizing that the Sovietization of Poland was a direct consequence of Nazi 
policy”42.
Opinions of the deteriorating condition of Germany’s image on the Iberian 
Peninsula were not only expressed by the British. Analyzing Madrid’s attitude towards 
the Winter War, dictator of the neighboring Portugal, António de Oliveira Salazar 
admitted that “despite the Spanish recognition of the favors offered during the civil war, 
there is no doubt that Spain’s general policy was characterized by lack of solidarity with 
Germany”43. This was confirmed by the Spanish and general Agustín Muñoz Grandes 
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revealed to the British frankly and up-to-the-point that the Spanish “were aware that 
Germany had abetted the attack on Finland and would not forget it”44.
The peace declared on 12th March 1940 was welcomed on the Iberian Peninsula 
with mixed feelings. Even though Finland managed to maintain its independence, which 
in face of clear military superiority of Joseph Stalin’s country was quite a success, it left 
war having lost a large part of its territory, with borders whose protection in case of 
another Soviet invasion would be much harder. The Spanish journals expressed various 
opinions as to assessment of the treaty. While ABC stressed the tough conditions 
imposed on the Fins45, La Vanguardia Española focused on proving that Talvisota was 
in fact a Soviet disgrace. “This peace is not, beyond any doubt, Russia’s success” –
journalist Santiago Nadal wrote joyously on the front page of the newspaper, adding 
that the Red Army turned out to have “feet of clay”46. Everybody, however, emphasized 
the heroism of the Finnish soldiers who without having obtained any major help from 
the outside, fulfilled their duty to their homeland. “Finland was abandoned on its 
horrible Way of the Cross and accepted peace it fought for, initialed with destruction 
and blood”– ABC noticed47. The government in Madrid, in accordance with its tested 
strategy, passed over the signed treaty in silence but the second-rate politicians were far 
more eager to share their opinion. One of them was a member of the National Falange 
Council, Ramón Caranda, when he sent an official letter to Winckelman, in which he 
congratulated the Fins for their bravery and wished them all the best in the future48.
Nevertheless, the conviction that “Stalin had to give up the idea of turning Finland into 
Kremlin’s vassal” seemed to be dominant on the Iberian Peninsula49.
This is how the end of the Winter War arrived, in which the Spanish – both the 
government and the society – clearly supported the invaded nation. At the same time, 
the Germans declaring their support for their eastern ally made it impossible for the 
Spanish to offer Finland timely help, despite the political willingness to do so. General 
Franco’s government was again forced to find the golden mean between its anti-Soviet 
policy and the necessity to maintain good relations with the Third Reich. These factors 
forced Madrid to give up the concept of sending volunteers to the northern front and to 
remain cautious in negotiations concerning weapons delivery. Despite all this, it was 
decided in the last stage of the campaign that military equipment should be sent to 
Finland, even though Spain, located at the other end of the continent was not the first to 
be predestined to offer such aid. Madrid’s cautious attitude was not what the Fins had 
expected but it needs to be mentioned that it was welcomed by other countries, 
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including the neighboring Portugal which had previously accused general Franco’s 
government of running too mild a policy towards the Soviet Union. The Spanish 
engagement was similarly evaluated by the Finnish historian Roni Tonni, who came to 
the conclusion that the Spaniards should be “paid a tribute”50 for the aid they offered 
Finland.
Portugal towards the Winter War
The Soviet aggression was anxiously observed also by Spain’s neighbor, 
Portugal. Its head, António de Oliveira Salazar, perceived the Soviet Union and 
communism in a similar way to general Franco. Both dictators believed the Soviets and 
the communist movement they supported not only a threat to their rule but also to whole 
Europe and perceived standing up to them as a somewhat historic mission. The vision of 
the Soviet Union taking over greater and greater territory of Central – Eastern Europe 
accompanied Salazar from the moment Ribbentrop-Molotov treaty was signed, 
especially from the moment of Soviet invasion on Poland on 17th September 1939. 
Portugal consistently stressed its hostility towards Joseph Stalin’s actions, sometimes 
criticizing Spain for – in Lisbon’s opinion – insufficiently manifested anticommunist 
approach51.
Portugal, located far from the chief events taking place on the continent, with its 
traditionally ally, i.e. Great Britain, since XIV century, had more opportunities than the 
neighboring Spain to openly criticize the German-Soviet alliance. Unlike general 
Franco’s country, it did not have any obligations towards the Third Reich that resulted 
from aid offered during a civil war. Moreover, Lisbon was located much further away 
from Berlin than Madrid. As a result, Portugal could take its criticism of Germany’s 
new ally much further than Madrid and this is precisely what it started doing from the 
first days of Soviet invasion on Poland. A similar approach was also adopted by 
Portugal when the Soviet Union began the Winter War, especially given that from the 
very beginning it was feared in Palácio das Necessidades that the Soviets would not 
stop with Finland and having suppressed it, they would turn to the other Scandinavian 
countries52.
The Portuguese, unlike the Spaniards, did not have diplomatic representatives in 
Helsinki, for which reason an Envoy in Oslo, Viscount of Riba Tȃ mega, was 
responsible for relations with the Fins. The situation was similar on the other side. In 
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their relations with Portugal, Helsinki was represented by an Envoy in Madrid, George 
Winckelmann. It was him who on 9th December 1939, that is right after the Spanish 
declaration, received words of support from Salazar for the country which “is fighting 
nobly against the Russian aggression”53 through the mouth of Portuguese Ambassador, 
Pedro Teotónio Pereira.
In order to weaken the Soviet Union, Portugal also used instruments provided by 
the League of Nations, despite its numerous weaknesses. Though Salazar remained 
skeptical towards this organization because of its disability and ignorance, this time he 
anticipated clearly that excluding Moscow from it would be a huge blow to the 
aggressor’s image. A relevant application on this matter was already filed by Argentina 
and Portugal supported it immediately54. The leader of the Portuguese delegation in 
Geneva, José Caeiro da Matta, even became the head of the Committee whose task was 
to express a standpoint towards the Buenos Aires project.
At the same time a voting was to take place in Geneva on appointing new 
members of the League of Nations Council, while Portugal was pressured to enter its 
ranks. Salazar firmly opposed to such a solution – he was highly critical of the 
operations of the League of Nations and believed engaging his country into its actions
was pointless. He ordered Caeiro da Matta to firmly oppose to all pressure and agree 
only on one condition - if “our presence was indispensable to guarantee unanimity in 
excluding the Soviet Union”55. Such an attitude shows how important it was for Salazar 
to punish Moscow for its attack on Finland, if in order to guarantee the desired result of 
one voting, he was ready to give his consent to at least three-year-long membership of 
Portugal in an institution he assessed highly critically.
Luckily for Portugal, such a step was not necessary and the newly appointed 
Council members did not exhibit a pro-Soviet attitude. Salazar, however, noticed the 
danger resulting from Caeiro de Matta’s leadership in the Committee as he was 
supposed to issue an opinion on the Argentinian project. He was mainly afraid of the 
situation in which the idea of excluding the Soviets from the League of Nations would 
not gain the majority of votes in the Committee or the Assembly and the institutions 
would resort only to appealing for peace. It might then seem that Portugal, leading the 
Committee, was making efforts to negotiate with Moscow, which would lead to 
questions about changes in Lisbon’s policy that, after all, repeatedly rejected the 
Soviets. For this reason before voting on the Argentinian application Salazar ordered 
Caeiro de Matta to deliver a speech which would dispel all doubts56. Following these 
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instructions, on 14th December the Portuguese representative clearly presented the 
approach of his country towards the Soviets during the Assembly’s meeting:
“Soviet Union’s attitude should not be viewed as a surprise. In 1934 Portugal, along 
with Holland and Switzerland, foresaw future events, voting against admitting the 
Soviet Union into the League of Nations. In view of the Soviet Union’s aggression and 
its refusal to report to the League of Nations57, there is no other way. A brave decision 
needs to be made and the Council should proclaim exclusion of the Soviet Union which 
has already situated itself outside the League of Nations”58.
All of these fears were unnecessary as the League of Nations voted for exclusion 
of the Soviet Union from its ranks on the same day. This declaration was yet another 
image failure of Joseph Stalin’s country, which started losing supporters in the so far 
favorable circles of the Western Left after its invasion on Finland59. Finland was then 
capable of doing what Poland, attacked three months earlier by the Red Army could not 
– undermine the pro-Soviet attitude among the Left-wing politicians and journalists. 
Also Salazar contributed to this transformation, though he approached the possibilities 
of the League of Nations rather rationally and skeptically and he was right in predicting 
that exclusion of the Soviet Union from this organization might bear great propaganda 
significance. Portugal was truly successful on the Geneva stage.
Lisbon’s engagement into the above initiative resulted in some perceiving it as a 
leader of the anti-Soviet movement. The quiet popular founder and leader of the 
Paneuropean Union Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi even suggested in a personal 
letter to Salazar that efforts should be made to organize a conference in Lisbon with all 
European countries willing to offer Finland help. He referred to Salazar’s “great moral 
authority” and Portugal’s advantages as a “power that was European, neutral, anti-
Bolshevik, distanced from Russia and Germany, remaining in better relations with all 
democratic and authoritarian countries in Europe and America”60. The goal of this 
initiative was the “immediate coordination of efforts in order to save the heroic nation in 
its lonely fight for our common civilization”61. Even though the issue of effective aid 
for the Fins was of Salazar’s concerns, the dictator did not accept Kalergi’s proposal. 
The contemporary Portugal did not have a good opinion of the political possibilities of 
the Paneuropean Union leader. The Portuguese Envoy in Bern, Jorge Santos, 
euphemistically described him as a man “slightly distant from the political reality” and 
called his organization too weak to effectively carry out any of its initiatives62. Salazar 
replied diplomatically that “the Portuguese government would not miss on any 
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opportunity to coordinate good will and efforts for the benefit of Finland”63, which 
Kalergi understood as acceptance of his idea and revealed to the newspapers that 
Portugal agreed to organize a conference in its capital64. Lisbon had no other option 
than deny the rumors65. Kalergi’s initiative ended in a fiasco. Portugal did not feel 
strong enough to take on realization of the undertaking designed by a politician believed 
to be a controversial idealist, though the fact that he addressed this matter to Salazar 
placed the Portuguese anticommunism in high esteem.
The Portuguese dictator completely agreed that the aid for Finland should come 
in the form of a coordinated action of many countries. The League of Nations called for 
it on the day it excluded the Soviet Union from its ranks and a list of goods that could 
be passed on to Finland was prepared. Salazar was rather skeptical about the possibility 
of this organization collecting aid, predicting that apart from “good will repeatedly 
manifested”, the League would not be able to offer the Fins anything more66. In 
February 1940 the Portuguese decided not to wait for a coordinated action and offered 
Fins corn, sugar, salt, cocoa, coffee, fruit, olive and Madeira wine67. Helsinki wanted 
only fruit from the list and additionally asked for canned fish. The Portuguese 
government agreed immediately and Salazar ordered the dispatch (altogether 20 
thousand cans) to take place urgently68. The Portuguese determination in offering the 
Fins help in their fight against the Soviets is also confirmed by the letter ambassador 
Armindo Monteiro sent a few days later to the Finnish ambassador in London asking if 
his soldiers would not definitely need the aforementioned goods69.
Help was also generously offered by the Portuguese nation. The ambassador of 
Finland in Stockholm thanked the Portuguese envoy P. Fereira for the collection 
organized in Portugal by the Finnish Red Cross70. A collection of donations for Finnish 
children was also organized on the first Saturday of March71. Places for them were also 
prepared in the Portuguese schools72, which the Envoy of Finland in Madrid, George 
Winckelmann, sent special thanks for to the Ministry for National Education73.
Approximately one hundred Portuguese also volunteered at the Finnish 
consulate in Lisbon to head to the Northern front. There were around 20 officers in the 
group and some of them were even veterans of the Spanish civil war74. Salazar 
approached this initiative quite unwillingly as he believed that in face of the extremely 
harsh weather conditions of the far North such a form of aid was “precarious” 
(precario)75. Nevertheless, he assured that the Portuguese government would not object 
to volunteers heading North but he did not wish for this phenomenon to become 
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common in Portugal. The war, however, was drawing to an end and finally the 
Portuguese soldiers did not appear on the Finnish ground.
George Winckelmann thanked for all the help offered by the government in 
Lisbon on 11th April in a letter addressed to Salazar76. A few days later the most popular
Portuguese journal back then, Diário de Noticias, published his thanks for the 
Portuguese nation: “The Finnish nation shall never forget the nobility of such an 
attitude. I am certain that the bonds between Portugal and Finland will become even 
tighter and will survive the cataclysm my country became an innocent victim of, also 
contributing to weakening the results of the unjustified aggression”77.
The newly forged friendship between the two nations had its epilogue directly 
after World War II finished. The unquestioned hero of Finland, Carl Gustaf 
Mannerheim, in November 1945 decided to choose Portugal as his vacation 
destination78. Greeted with ovations by the Portuguese, the marshal spent 6 weeks at the 
Atlantic Ocean, during which he was received both by Salazar and president Oscar 
Carmona. His visit, apart from health improving purposes, was also an opportunity for 
talks about the attitude of both countries to the slowly emerging coldwar reality79.
Mannerheim thanked the head of the diplomatic protocol, Henrique Vianna, for the 
Portuguese hospitality and organization of his stay in a hand-written letter in French80.
Conclusions
Franco and Salazar’s attitudes towards the Winter War demonstrate many 
similarities. They both perceived the Soviet attack as a potential danger of expansion of 
the communistic influence in Europe and therefore a threat to their rule and future fate 
of the continent. Even though Finland was located at the opposite end of Europe, during 
the 1939/1940 winter it seemed close to both Iberian nations. For the Francoists 
Talvisota, in the ideological meaning, was a continuation of their civil war against 
communism, while for the Portuguese it was a successful battle of a minor country –
similar to Portugal itself – for independence. Both dictators were convinced that Fins 
deserved help, though it was provided in different ways. While Spain preferred bilateral 
negotiations on sending weapons to Scandinavia, Portugal made use of the argument its 
stronger neighbor did not have – membership in the League of Nations, where it greatly 
contributed to exclusion of the Soviet Union from this organization. In both countries 
the Finland case was highly supported by the society, which showed itself in organized 
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demonstrations, charity collections, volunteers applying to go to the front or articles 
with kind words. Neither Lisbon nor Madrid could have made full use of all the 
instruments they possessed. The fear of ruining the relations with the Third Reich, 
which remained the Soviet Union’s ally, or finally the insufficiently strong international 
position sometimes forced the countries to limit the aid they offered, though these 
aspects were more visible in case of Spain.
The scale of help offered by the international society was received highly 
critically in Helsinki, which is best illustrated by words of Finland’s Foreign Minister, 
Väinö Tanner, spoken on the day the tough treaty with the Soviets was signed: “We are 
too small a nation to make anyone interested in us”81. Against the background of other 
countries that could have effectively helped Helsinki but did not do it for a variety of
reasons, the attitude of Spain and Portugal presents itself quite favorably. They were not 
the first ones to be predestined to offer support but the effort they made to manifest their 
willingness to prevent expansion of the Soviet Union was appreciated in the distant 
Finland.
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